Taking It Personally: Legal Ethics and Client Selection by Hutchinson, Allan C.
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship
1998
Taking It Personally: Legal Ethics and Client
Selection
Allan C. Hutchinson
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, ahutchinson@osgoode.yorku.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Recommended Citation
Hutchinson, Allan C. "Taking It Personally: Legal Ethics and Client Selection." Legal Ethics 1.2 (1998): 168-183.
  
 
 
 
Taking It Personally: 
Legal Ethics and Client 
Selection 
 
ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON 1 
 
 
A couple of years ago, I taught a class on legal ethics. In typical fashion, I began by 
throwing out a crude hypothetical. It went something along the lines that, as a young 
lawyer, your client tells you that he has discovered that he is HIV-positive (which has 
not developed into full-blown AIDS) from a botched injection by his doctor. He requests 
you to negotiate a settlement on his behalf. Negotiations proceed quickly and the doctor's 
lawyers seem willing to settle for a sizeable amount. Shortly before finalising the 
settlement, the client informs you that he has had a second medical examination and this 
has conclusively revealed that he is not HIV-positive. However, he insists that he still 
wants you to continue the negotiations on the basis that he is HIV-positive and to take 
the settlement on offer. What do you do? What should you do? To my considerable 
surprise, a significant number of students insisted that they should follow their client's 
instructions: it was for the doctor's lawyer to ascertain whether or not your client is 
telling the truth. Moreover, in doing so, most contended that not only would they not be 
acting unethically, but that they would actually be fulfilling the special moral obligations of 
lawyers to put their clients ahead of all others. After some discussion, most students were 
reassured that such a course of action would not only be unethical, but also tantamount to 
fraud. Nonetheless, a few still persisted in protesting the moral innocence of the lawyer, 
whatever the ethical impropriety of the client's instructions. 
This incident galvanised me in my belief that the appreciation of legal ethics and 
professional responsibility was very low and in need of revitalisation. The fault in the 
situation was less that of the students and more that of the legal community, including 
lawyers, professors, judges and administrators. How ever wrong-headed the students 
were, their response reflected a common misunderstanding about legal ethics and 
professional responsibility-that lawyers are simply glib actors who do the bidding of 
their directorial clients. The general view seemed to be that, when acting as lawyers, 
people should set aside their own moral values and expectations and replace them with 
a professional ethic that was exhausted by the simple maxim that 'you should be a 
zealous advocate for your clients' interests'. The suggestion that lawyers might import 
some of their own personal values into their professional practice was considered, at 
best, inconvenient and, at worst, inappropriate. Consequently, it seemed more urgent than 
ever to challenge this received wisdom and interrogate the traditional understandings of 
appropriate legal practice and to recommend a more appealing sensibility and approach to 
the ethical responsibilities of legal professionals. 
Accordingly, this short essay is a preliminary and modest effort to suggest a different 
and less traditional contribution to debates around on legal ethics and professional 
responsibility. The driving ambition is to redeem the ethical possibilities that the legal 
profession presently seem to honour more in the breach than the observance. To do this, I 
introduce and defend the need to develop a more rigorous and demanding sense of 
professional judgement. After sketching the basic thrust of such an invigorated practice, I 
illustrate its workings and possible implications by reference to the largely neglected 
topic of client selection. Moreover, I want to do this by using a method that is more 
conducive to the fact that matters of legal ethics and professional responsibility should be 
dealt with in a contextualised and particularised way, rather than by reference to abstract 
and generalised norms. Although I intend to be focused and rudimentary, my discussion 
is part of a larger project that has a more ambitious objective. Heeding Lord  
Bo l ingb roke ’ s  caution that "the profession of law, in its nature the noblest and most 
beneficial t o  mankind, is in its abuse an abasement of the most sordid and pernicious 
kind," 2 I want to advise young (and old) lawyers against the temptation to professional 
abasement in the belief that it is done for the most noble and beneficial of professional 
causes. Legal ethics and professional responsibility can be 'most beneficial to mankind' 
when lawyers take them seriously as issues of personal as well as professional good 
character. 
 
Beyond Rules 
The term 'ethics' is derived from the Greek ethike which was used to denote the science 
of character. This was not considered to be solely or even mainly a matter of ruleforming, 
but involved the development of a personal faculty of good judgement that would respond 
to as well be refined in particular situations. Rules and professional codes assume that 
lawyers have good character and can go about their lawyering lives with an ability to 
apply those rules wisely and appropriately. This is the idea of professionalism. Although 
it has become almost perjorative in popular usage and resonance, the idea of professional 
judgement is important; it involves more than the technically adept performance of a 
particular task, without any concern for its broader redeeming qualities or impact. As I 
use it, professionalism is an approach or attitude that embodies a justification for a 
particular course of conduct within a wider account of a morally defensible modus 
vivendi. It has a vital moral dimension that defines who lawyers are and what they 
aspire to be individually and collectively. It is not simply a vague and general aspiration, 
but entails a definite response to issues like the availability of legal services, the clients 
one accepts, the causes one pursues, etc. 
A large part of that professional responsibility is to recognise that, except in the most 
egregious circumstances, there is no one clear role to fill and no obvious action to take; 
there is only the obligation to decide what that role should be for you and what action 
should be taken by you. While this critical process will be heavily influenced by 
professional codes and the values of the informing collegial community, it is a personal 
responsibility that involves, but does not reduce to, professional norms: "lawyer 
morality is ordinary morality which takes into consideration the moral value of 
professional obligations."3 In striving to cultivate such a practical ethic of professional 
judgement, it must not be forgotten that this is not equivalent to an ethic of principle 
in which ethical conduct is vouchsafed by the strong adherence to accepted and 
general codes. Character is reflected in all we do and what we do affects our character; 
it is a life-long process of development, re-adjustment and determination. 
One critic who has lamented the demise of professional standards is Anthony 
Kronman. For him, the rationalisation and commercialisation of legal practice has led, 
within the profession, to disenchantment with the "lawyer-statesman" ideal that used 
to dominate and inform good lawyering. This ideal put great emphasis on a practical 
wisdom that both informed and transcended code-following or rule-adherence, and on 
the commitment to a shared set of communal ends.4 For Kronman, the talent of good 
judgment is radically inegalitarian not only in the sense that it is unevenly distributed, 
but also in that it is conducive to a political fraternity that recognises that the legal 
community has a special responsibility and facility, as a trained elite, to do what is best 
for society at large. While Kronman is on to something when he urges greater attention 
to the development of practical wisdom and professional judgment, there is no reason 
at all why the cultivation of such attributes needs to be associated with such an elitist 
vision of the legal profession. Although it is true that judgment is a difficult quality to 
teach and acquire, it is not the god-given gift that Kronman and others imply. To 
adhere to such a position not only discourages people from seeking to enter the legal 
profession, but also excuses those without good judgment from taking responsibility for 
what they do and from working to improve their skill of judgment. Unlike Kronman, I 
believe that 'practical judgment' is less a character trait that people either do or do not 
possess and more a learned skill that people can be taught, and can refine for 
themselves with practice. 
In teaching legal ethics and professional responsibility, therefore, considerable 
attention must be devoted to simulating situations in which lawyers can build moral 
character and good judgment. As Aristotle insisted, these attributes are developed by 
engaging in practical situations and reflecting critically on those experiences so as to 
enhance and refine their sense of judgment. 5 Consequently, this suggests that the 
achievement of moral character and good judgement cannot be attained by feeding 
students the relevant rules and a sense of the theoretical models; theory cannot 
substitute for practice and logic cannot replace judgment. This does not mean that 
theory has no place, but it cannot dispense with the need for learning by immersion 
in practical situations and by the development of a context-sensitive sense of applied 
judgment. 6 It cannot be taught, but needs to be learnt in a trial-and-error way that 
has a built-in component of critical reflection and collegial dialogue. Instruction will 
need to contain a clinical element if it is to have any prospect of nurturing a sense of 
good judgment in law students and lawyers; it will not be sufficient to urge upon 
neophytes the necessity to develop good character, without some structured and 
supervised opportunities to cultivate a talent for making good decisions. The obvious 
virtue of ethical principles is often belied by the complexity of practical situations; 
obligation and duty are not on/off concepts, but vary in weight and force depending 
on the context. Moreover, 'doing the right thing' will not always be apparent or 
persuasive to others. 
In recommending the importance of professional judgment, I take issue with the 
traditional image of the ethical lawyer which instructs lawyers to subordinate their 
personal morality and identity to the standardised requirements of a role-defined and 
rule-based morality. This expects that legal professionals will appreciate and actualise 
the demands of a role-differentiated morality in which lawyers' duties are exclusively 
bound by the law and the professional code of conduct on one side and the client's 
interests on the other. As such, it assumes a two-dimensional moral universe in 
which lawyers are no more expected to intrude their own personal values than actors 
or butlers in the performance of their duties.7 Such a notion allows persons to claim 
moral legitimacy for actions that might be considered illegitimate in other different 
roles and contexts. 8 Moreover, in this professional role, lawyers are required to treat 
morality in the same way that they deal with law-as an exhaustive body of rules that 
can be formally applied to resolve the most recalcitrant of difficulties and dilemmas. 
Consequently, in the traditional approach, there is very little space for reflection or 
engagement; reference to the professional codes is intended to provide definitive and 
authoritative answers. 
To read most codes of professional conduct is to encounter a series of 
pronouncements that are long on righteous aspiration and vague generalities, but short 
on serious instruction and concrete guidance. It is a case of not seeing the ethical 
forest for the law-like trees. Although lawyers are weighed down with discrete and 
detailed directives on particular matters, there is little to counsel the floundering or 
jaded lawyer in establishing an overall and professional modus vivendi. Like the 
formalist lawyering that many claim to embody and extol, ethics is reduced to a 
technical compliance with a set of simple do's and don'ts. It is more of a shopping list 
than a genuine effort to inculcate a style and substance of legal practice that addresses 
the whole lawyer, not merely the occasional legal transaction. It is as much about 
conformity as it is about conscience. Lawyers approach ethics in the same way that 
they approach law-as a set of rules to be mastered and manipulated to serve the purpose 
in hand. Indeed, under the sway of a legalistic mentality, the teaching of legal ethics 
and responsibility is more like a course on office management; it is as much about 
techniques in filing and organisation as it is about thinking through dilemmas and 
difficulties. 
Even assuming that the various codes are treated as representing a serious attempt 
at ethical instruction and control, an exclusive concentration on the rules is misplaced. 
There is little to be gained by providing an elaborate and exhaustive annotation of the 
rules of professional conduct because, not only has this been adequately done, but it 
ignores the very real fact that the influence on lawyers' daily routines and rituals is small: 
the constant attention to and re-drafting of the rules is of decreasing marginal utility.9 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the codes have no place in any appreciation of legal 
ethics and their actual improvement. They are an important resource in discussion and 
decision-making, but they are not a decisive or determinate play-book that relieves lawyers 
of the personal responsibility to develop an ethical style and substance of legal practice. 
The codes are a site at which ethical debate can be joined and developed. As with many 
catalogues of rights and responsibilities, there will be competing and occasionally 
contradictory imperatives; duties to clients might suggest a different course of action to 
those recommended by the lawyers' responsibilities as an officer of the court. Insome 
instances, the rules demand that lawyers 'must' make certain choices and give priority to 
certain actions. However, the rules more often offer no definite resolution and simply 
provide a rudimentary framework within which lawyers can debate and develop an 
ethical practice of law. It is important, therefore, to remember that the rules do not and 
cannot relieve lawyers of the continuing responsibility to exercise their own professional 
and moral judgement ab o u t  the appropriate course to follow. 
As presently practised, legal ethics is too easily reducible to an unthinking compliance 
with the prevailing Rules of professional conduct in order to avoid discipline or disrepute. 
Indeed, the Rules are rarely referenced and it is more common for practitioners to resort 
to personal conscience in order to determine what is a professionally appropriate course 
of action. 10 Like general ethics, legal ethics is contextual in the sense that it involves 
particular people in particular situations making difficult decisions with particular time 
constraints, with imperfect information, and with particular consequences for particular 
people. And, of course, there is no context of contexts that allows people to fix once-
andfor-all their obligations and actions when acting in personal or professional roles. 
There are few right answers that stand outside any context or debate. The traditional 
understandings and expectations are nothing more (or less) than the accumulated 
practices of lawyers that have been affixed with institutional authority. Lawyers can and 
should contribute as much as respond to the developing culture of lawyering. In this 
way, they are in a better position to cultivate a modus vivendi that enables them to bring 
together the promptings of their personal conscience with the demands of their 
professional occupation. Legal ethics ought to be an active meditation on law and 
lawyering rather than a passive and neutral adherence to a professional code. Indeed, the 
rules are less a set of directives from which lawyers can draw clear guidance than a 
collection of practical wisdom which lawyers can engage with and contest.11 Accordingly, 
compliance with law, in both its spirit and letter, does not amount to acceptable ethical 
behaviour: professional morality is more than law-abiding conformity. 
 
2 Professional Judgment 
The fact that most legal decisions and ethical practices by lawyers allow for a variety of 
manoeuvres or results means that lawyers need to develop a professional facility to 
comprehend and handle such challenges. There is rarely an obvious or incontestable path to 
follow. As much modern ethical theorising insists, what counts as acting ethically will 
always be a contextual question. It bears repeating that there is no universal context that 
allows people to fix once-and-for-all the obligations and actions of the ethically-aware 
lawyer. In a world of shifting contexts, there is an even greater need to develop a sense of 
moral judgement that can respond flexibly and firmly to the different challenges that 
lawyers face in their professional lives. None of this should be taken to mean that ethical 
behaviour and decision-making is condemned to be irrational or arbitrary, only that what 
counts and operates as reason is never outside of its informing context. Moreover, the 
alleged uncertainty of a contextual approach is no more or less inefficient than compliance 
with any other legal standard; certainty is not a virtue in and of itself. For instance, in 
determining whether their professional conduct meets the tortious standards of negligence, 
lawyers are accustomed to engage in a similar kind of contextualised judgement and 
assessment. 12 
In this way, legal ethics can be viewed less as a fixed and independent code of 
professional conduct and more as continuing practice within which lawyers construct 
acceptable norms of behaviour as they struggle to comply with them. Also, there is 
always the personal ethical challenge of determining whether, because the Rules allow 
certain conduct, the individual lawyer should reflect on, and perhaps refuse to operate in, 
certain ways. The fact that the Rules allow lawyers to ignore the interests of other parties 
entirely does not mean that it is a morally unimpeachable course to follow: 'can' does 
not necessarily imply 'must'. It is in this grey area that the pull of personal values can 
have its most pertinent and relevant moral purchase: lawyers are accorded the space and 
responsibility to act in a way that is most consonant with their own ethical compass. To 
abandon such responsibility and to ignore such practical possibilities is to shirk the 
challenge that can bestow upon lawyers, both collectively and individually, professional 
prestige and moral welfare. 
To be an ethical lawyer, therefore, involves more than learning and applying a set of 
rules; it demands the cultivation of a critical reflection upon the professional role and 
responsibilities of lawyers. In short, a fully ethical practice requires an independent sense 
of moral virtue that involves the life-long development of personal moral character. 
Because there is no one answer to ethical dilemmas, it does not mean that reasoning can 
be abandoned or that 'anything goes'. A contextual approach simply insists that there is 
no final or objective answer to ethical problems, not that there are no answers. As the late 
Isaiah Berlin argued: 
 
From this perspective, therefore, legal ethics is not about perfecting universalisable 
and enduring codes of conduct. It is about developing a transformative and pluralistic 
practice that respects the contingent and the particular and allows for diverse answers and 
appreciations. The traditional concepts and practices of honesty, confidentiality, trust, etc. 
remain most pertinent, but they are given meaning and bite as the context varies; they 
are fundamental, but not absolute values in the legal ethics vocabulary. As Lon Fuller 
pointed out, there is a vast difference between a professional duty that is based on 'duty' as 
opposed to 'aspiration' .14 Whereas the former focuses on compliance with a set of rules 
and concentrates on what is not to be done rather than what ought to be done, the latter 
speaks in more positive terms and asks professionals to develop a style of practice that 
inspires ethical conduct rather than merely avoids unethical acts. The traditional emphasis 
on code-based morality breeds a mentality that is more concerned with delineating how 
far a lawyer can go without engaging in ethical conduct: it tends to privilege social 
conformity over efforts to build moral character. 
In contrast to understanding the demands of legal ethics as being satisfied by the 
memorisation and rote-application of institutionalised responses to particular fact-situations, 
it ought to be about developing a framework within which to understand and reflect about 
the inevitable ethical dilemmas that arise as a professional. As such, legal ethics should 
be an integral dimension of what it means to be a good lawyer that pervades and 
infiltrates a professional's whole way of thinking and acting as a lawyer. In developing 
such a notion and practice of professional ethics, the challenge is neither to abandon a 
sense of personal morality and defer all ethical responsibility to the unique role and status 
of the legal professional nor to adhere entirely to the dictates of one's personal 
conscience and ignore the special responsibilities that attach to being a professional. It is a 
matter of creating a balance between the two such that it becomes possible to bring 
together the professional and the personal in a legal ethics that satisfies the pushes of 
personal morality and the pulls of professional conduct. To do otherwise is to either 
relinquish personal responsibility entirely to the self-interested norms of official codes of 
professional conduct or to ignore entirely the genuine framework of professional 
responsibilities that must influence and affect the dictates of personal conscience. It most 
definitely is not a choice between law and morality, such that the true professional must 
abandon all efforts to be a good person in being a good lawyer. 
Accordingly, so legal ethics does not simply collapse into personal morality, there has 
to be recognition that 'role-differentiated behaviour' has a legitimate claim on the 
attention of those who strive to be ethical lawyers. Although lawyers must assume 
personal responsibility for their professional activities, it does not mean that they must 
only do as lawyers what they would do as an individual (which, in many cases, might 
turn out to be very extensive). It simply asks them to consider for themselves the extent 
of dissonance that a professionally-differentiated role should allow. Mindful of the social 
and political realities in which they offer their professional services, lawyers must 
confront the consequences of their choices about who to represent, the methods of 
representation and the broader consequences of their work. If lawyers did permit their own 
values and preferences to infiltrate all their work, it would mean that lawyers were 
abusing their privileges by rationing a valuable public service only to those whose views 
happen to coincide with their own. However, this does not mandate a wholescale 
abrogation of moral responsibility by lawyers. Instead, it suggests that lawyers should 
try to better integrate their professional and personal lives. Re-working the balance 
between role-morality and personal conscience, a fresh account of legal ethics would 
place the individual at the centre of the process and encourage lawyers to develop a 
critical morality that encompasses such pressing issues as 'what kind of lawyer do I 
want to be?' and 'what interests am I going to spend my life serving as a lawyer?' 
In sum, asking lawyers to cabin their moral judgment, endangers the whole moral 
standing of the legal profession. In the traditional approach, there is very little space for 
reflection or engagement; reference to the Rules is intended to provide definitive and 
authoritative answers. My approach suggests that legal ethics has more to do with a 
practice of situated reasoning and with the interests, purposes and consequences of and 
for the participants and their contexts. Reliance on codes atrophies the moral intelligence 
and leaves lawyers adrift without a moral compass when those professional rules run out 
or give conflicting advice. My approach encourages continual reflection and therefore 
better prepares the lawyer for difficult situations. The other choice for the enlightened 
lawyer is to abandon the notion of a professionally-differentiated role morality entirely 
and incorporate all their personal values into the professional arena. This seems an unwise 
and undesirable move as lawyers will be abandoning their public trust and abusing their 
monopolistic privileges. The challenge is to integrate the demands of a professional role 
with the dictates of a personal morality and be able to construct important bridges between 
the two so that they can each support and fructify each other: one feeds off the other. 
To exercise sound professional judgement, it is necessary to resort to a well-honed and 
mature sense of moral acuity. Unless one subscribes to a very formalistic account of law, 
a familiarity with and sensitivity to moral issues is an essential quality that all lawyers 
must have if they are to advise clients about any particular area of law or what the 
courts are likely to do in any particular case. Without such resources, lawyers will be ill-
equipped to fulfill the most basic skills of legal representation; they become only 
technicians, not advisers. To flinch this challenge or to settle it by default is to fail as 
both a matter of professional and personal responsibility; it will impoverish both 
professional and personal pursuits. As Robert Megarry concluded, "clients, of course, 
come and go; but your conscience does not, and you will have to live with it for the rest 
of your life."16 
 
3 Selecting Clients 
The circumstances in which one is asked or expected to demonstrate good professional 
judgement are infinite. Most have received or are beginning to receive considerable 
attention. However, client selection is one of the most important and most neglected 
issues for lawyers. Indeed, it can be strenuously argued that there is no more important 
issue for lawyers than how they are going to select the persons to whom they agree to 
provide their services because, once a client is taken on, the lawyer has become 
committed to a whole host of ethical and moral obligations. Lawyers and clients are 
engaged in a special relationship that lawyers cannot simply abandon as and when they 
choose. Moreover, all clients are entitled to the same level of competence and 
commitment from their lawyers. Once the lawyer-client relationship is established, a large 
part of the ethical die is cast. While the precise scope and substance of that relationship 
are imprecise, lawyers' options about what they are and are not prepared to do are 
severely curtailed and their obligation closely circumscribed. This is entirely reasonable 
as, under any realistic vision of professional responsibility, it would be unconscionable to 
take on clients and represent them in an incompetent or half-hearted way; this is a 
travesty of any kind of ethical expectation. Accordingly, the basis on which lawyers 
decide which persons or organisations to take on as clients has all kinds of ethical 
implications and salience. 
For instance, in Canada, lawyers can choose to represent whomsoever they wish; the 
roster of potential clients is limitless. While the oath taken on call to the Bar often 
contains a commitment to "refuse no man's just cause'', this is more of a token gesture of 
ceremonial window-dressing. Although the professional rules are imbued with a general 
sense that legal services are important and should be made available to everyone, there 
are no prohibitions on lawyers refusing to represent particular clients or causes. However, 
while it is arguable that it was the case under most general human rights laws, some 
jurisdictions have recently declared that lawyers must not make their choice of clients in 
a way that discriminates on the basis of race, gender, etc. This stipulation is well overdue. 
Other than this, however, lawyers are not formally constrained in their decision of how to 
allocate their services and expertise. It falls within that important grey area in which 
professional expectations and personal values merge. There are two major and inter-related 
ethical issues that pervade this important decision-is there an obligation to take unpopular 
cases; and is it ever professionally responsible to refuse certain cases? The fact that 
these questions have received relatively short shrift in the literature is troublesome in 
itself. 
The first thing to note is that many young lawyers make this vital decision about the 
general kind of clients that they are going to represent without realising it. Any decision 
about the type of law practice or area of law that a young lawyer makes in choosing 
or accepting employment is critical. For instance, a decision to join a large urban firm 
that has mostly corporate clients has already ensured that the lawyer will be dealing with 
certain areas of law and from a certain perspective; being an environmental lawyer for 
some firms and, therefore, some clients (i.e., chemical corporations) is very different from 
working for other firms and other clients (i.e., environmental activists). Similarly, young 
lawyers who decide to set up their own firm have, unless they have established contacts 
and commitments, narrowed considerably the kind of clients and issues that they are likely 
to deal with, especially in their early years. In the following example, it is naive to believe 
that there are not ethical implications for the kind of lawyer that you want to become. 
Of course, the decision of what to do is not obvious: a decision either way can be 
defended in strong ethical terms. It is less of a case of condemning certain decisions and 
more of praising others. The key point is that, no matter how one decides, it has to be 
conceded that there is a pressing issue of legal ethics in play. 
 
Problem I-Times are tight: you are a single parent and the bills are mounting up. 
With a mixed law school record and after being unemployed for six months, you 
are offered a reasonably well-paying job with a small firm whose main business is 
debt enforcement for large corporations and banks. As well as drafting air-tight loan 
agreements for the lenders, you are expected to be a vigorous and unyielding 
litigator. Would you take the job and why? 
Although there is much rhetoric to the contrary, the traditional practice on client 
selection is that lawyers are neither under any obligation to take unpopular cases nor are 
they ethically compromised by the moral (un)worthiness of their clients' causes. Although 
lawyers are conferred with special privileges in pursuing their profession, they still retain 
considerable autonomy in how they utilise those privileges: the importance of the public's 
need for legal services does not submerge entirely lawyers' own sense of choice over 
how they work. However, once lawyers do make a decision to enter into a lawyer-client 
relation, their unswerving commitment to the cause of their clients is not to be interpreted 
as in any way supporting or condoning that cause. Unless they participate directly in 
unethical or illegal behaviour themselves, lawyers are to be treated as independent and 
moral agents; the sins of clients are not to be inflicted upon their lawyers. As Charles Fried 
argues, "as a professional person, one has a special care for the interests of those accepted 
as clients, just as his friends, his family, and he himself have a very general claim to his 
special concern."17 
For some commentators, lawyers not only can, but should accept all requests for legal 
assistance, no matter how unpopular or unjust. The rationale for this is twofold. First, 
any other course of action would effectively deprive people of their legal rights; without 
legal representation, people's legal rights can be rendered hollow and ineffective. 
Secondly, for lawyers to determine the worth or merit of a legal claim at the outset is to 
usurp the function of the jury. While these arguments might have some bite in the 
criminal area, they have little to recommend them in civil matters. Moreover, even in the 
criminal area, it offers no compelling reason for why that lawyer has to be you. 
Although it is true that everyone has the right to be legally represented, this is not an 
argument as to why a particular lawyer should have a duty to be everyone and anyone's 
lawyer. Of course, there might be circumstances where lawyers believe that undeserving 
clients are entitled to their services because they believe that such clients should have a 
lawyer even though they cannot afford one or because they will be treated unfairly by the 
system. This eventuality might be particularly pressing where the lawyer is one of the 
very few local professionals with expertise in a particular area of law. It is not 
inconsistent to suggest that, while a lawyer might prefer to represent (or not represent) 
certain types of client, they might also recognise that such a preference might be 
outweighed in some special circumstances-personal judgement is nuanced and its exercise 
is heavily contextualised. 
According to Duncan Kennedy, 18 the right not to take clients has a much wider moral 
ambit than simply refusing to represent people or organisations which you think have 
evil intentions or of whose activities you disapprove. He maintains that lawyers should take 
full responsibility for the clients that they take and the causes that they advance: it is 
ethically wrong to argue a case or a cause that will do more harm than good if you 
think that your client should not be in court in the first place or that your client should 
lose. In particular, you should not represent clients who are using technical defences 
to avoid justified liability or who are enforcing their valid legal rights in a bad cause. For 
Kennedy, "you are tarred with the bad actions of clients that you facilitate in your 
work as a lawyer." 19 Working against/for unionisation if you are pro/anti-union or 
advising for the postponement/implementation of environmental controls if you are 
pro/anti-environmental rights is something that lawyers should not do, and they should 
not do it as a matter of professional ethical responsibility. This does not mean that 
lawyers should only choose to represent clients of which I or anyone else would approve. 
It simply means that lawyers should only represent clients or causes that they are 
prepared to defend as being more rather than less beneficial for society. 
The argument that lawyers should have an obligation to take any and all clients 
founders on a number of critical reefs. First, most lawyers draw the line at representing 
clients for free. This is not unreasonable; lawyers are not charities. There is no particular 
reason why some lawyers should shoulder singly a problem of non-accessibility that has 
public and collective causes and that could be dealt with by a more compelling pro bono 
obligation. If the profession is to have any real chance of matching its rhetoric of service 
to the reality of social need, lawyers must begin to take seriously the obligation to provide 
their services at reduced rates, to take legal aid clients, and to engage in pro bono work. It 
is not enough to heap praise on those lawyers who undertake such work. This obligation 
must be built into the basic ethical fabric of professional responsibility. 'Access to justice' 
is a hollow slogan unless there is genuine access to legal services. The legal profession is 
too quick to trumpet the moral obligation to perform pro bono work, but very slow at 
fulfilling it. Even when it is done, it is seen as a virtuous act of noblesse oblige rather 
than a basic responsibility that comes with being a lawyer.20 
Secondly, it is true that there is an obligation on the legal profession to ensure 
that people have access to lawyers; it is a hypocritical process and profession that 
trumpets people's rights, but fails to provide available means to exercise them fully. 
However, while the profession has such a collective responsibility, this does not provide 
an obvious answer as to why any particular lawyer should be obliged to take on any 
particular client. This argument only has bite where the lawyer is the 'last lawyer in 
town'21 and the client has no other means of legal representation to which to turn. 
Nevertheless, there are clearly cases where people have been refused representation by 
lawyers as a result of considerations that are unrelated to their legal cause. While some 
unpopular clients or causes are going without legal representation, it is as likely the 
case that more potential clients fail to get a lawyer because of their inability to pay 
than because of the unpopularity of their case. Again, provided that lawyers are not 
using illegal criteria to make such decisions (e.g., race, gender, etc.) and there are no 
extenuating circumstances (e.g., the only available lawyer), it seems reasonable to allow 
lawyers a degree of choice in selecting the persons or organisations whom they will 
represent. 
In the following situations, lawyers are presented with difficult decisions and the way 
in which they respond to them will reveal much about their approach to legal practice 
and their commitment to professional responsibility: 
 
Problem 2-A well-dressed couple come to your office to seek your services. They 
tell you that they made an arrangement with an elderly couple to caretake a 
property they own while they were out of the country for a year. Now that they 
have returned, they no longer want to pay the couple the $3000 that they had 
informally promised to pay them, even though the elderly couple had done the 
work in exemplary fashion and now need the money. Do you agree to help them 
to get out of the deal? Would it make a difference to you, if these people were 
already clients of yours in other matters, they were willing to pay you handsomely, 
they had discovered that the elderly couple were cheating Revenue Canada, you 
were short of clients, etc.? 
Problem 3-At a meeting of your law firm, it is suggested henceforth that 
members of the firm should represent only women in spousal abuse cases. Do you 
agree with such a policy? Does it make any difference if this policy is adopted 
by a publicly-funded, legal-aid clinic? 
 
Again, in both situations, there are no easy or pat answers. It will be for each lawyer to 
make a contextualised decision that he or she is prepared to defend. Most importantly, 
lawyers should appreciate that there is no position of no-decision: whatever decision they 
make will reflect and implicate a certain stand on the nature and extent of ethical 
obligations in the practice of law. Moreover, because one lawyer is or is not prepared to 
act in one way or another is not in itself cause to criticise others who do not take a 
similar stance as professionally unethical. At most, it is an occasion on which lawyers can 
agree to disagree as well as work to persuade each other of the moral superiority of their 
own position. 
In general, it is no excuse or justification to argue that, if you do not take the case, 
somebody else will or that it is a wealthy client who will generate sizeable income--
these are weak efforts at ethical rationalisation. Nevertheless, although economic logic is 
not of itself a decisive moral imperative, it can be a contextual factor in any decision to 
accept certain clients; a moral absolutist stance is as unrealistic as one that reduces 
ethical reflection to economic calculation. While it is important that your clients have a 
legal basis for their action, it is only a necessary, but not sufficient condition for your 
involvement. Also, because lawyers influence the law's content through their advocacy, 
they must take some responsibility for the way in which the law develops and unfolds. For 
instance, tax lawyers _ earn their keep by advising rich clients on how to get around tax 
laws and, in the process, affect the interpretation of the law itself, often bringing about 
legislative changes and revisions. Often, tax lawyers are consulted by the government on 
the wisdom or merit of particular changes to the tax system. It ill-behooves such lawyers to 
pretend that they merely respond to a system that functions independently of them. 
Because tax lawyers largely represent the business and investment sector, they do little to 
help the rest the population and might indeed have some responsibility for shifting the tax 
burden on to the poorer parts of the population. 22 
Before taking on any clients, it seems ethically incumbent upon lawyers to talk to them. 
This need not be a one-way lecture to the potential client about the lawyers' ethical 
values, but it might be a conversation in which lawyer and client outline their basic 
expectations of each other. Q!iestions that lawyers might ask before taking on a client 
include whether the objective of the case is worthy and whether the means that might be 
required are something that they can and are prepared to do. Of course, it will be 
important that lawyers inform potential clients of the ethical limits that they place on 
their provision of legal services; this might include negotiation tactics, cross-examination 
style, etc. For instance, even if a prospective client has a strong case in a matrimonial 
dispute, there seems no particular reason why lawyers should be obliged to accept them as 
clients if they want their lawyer to take the most aggressive and unyielding approach to 
their spouse. While there is nothing necessarily wrong with lawyers adopting such an 
approach, it will be incumbent upon them to take personal responsibility for such an 
approach and not hide behind the rhetoric of the traditional model. Such matters must, of 
course, be dealt with before the lawyer-client relationship is established, rather than after 
it; it is reasonable that clients are entitled to expect lawyers to act in accordance with 
traditional perceptions of 'zealous advocacy' unless their lawyers inform them differently. 
The ethical premise that underlies this collaborative suggestion is that lawyers should 
treat their potential clients as moral persons who are capable of engaging in debate and 
changing; the hope is that, in doing so, lawyer and client together will create pressure to 
push up, not squeeze down, the ethical standards of professional conduct. At the same time, 
it is unrealistic to expect that every lawyer will, like Socrates, only be guided by the need 
to do right rather than wrong: most lawyers are reasonably concerned about their jobs, 
paying their mortgages, providing for their children, etc. Furthermore, it is impractical to 
believe that lawyers and clients will have to share a whole ethical outlook on life to be 
able to establish a workable and moral professional relationship. It might be that lawyers 
will need to make an important distinction between 'values' (i.e., preferences that are to 
be weighed in any ethical decision) and 'convictions' (i.e., baselines against which other 
values and preferences are to be set) . For example, while lawyers might refuse to 
represent a particular side in the abortion struggle, they might not have a difficulty in 
representing such persons in unrelated property transactions. 
 4 Personal Responsibility 
Sadly, the traditional vision of lawyering tends to be as much a convenient device by 
which to finesse the hard questions of practice as a useful tool with which to confront 
and grapple with them. While the idea of professionalism ought to be a reliable guide to 
lawyers, this does not imply that its content and orientation must be unchanging; "it 
makes sense to view professionalism not as a fixed ideal, but rather as an ongoing 
struggle."23 In many ways, professional Rules do little service in the day-to-day practice of 
lawyers as a result of their generality and vagueness: ethical problems are often too 
complex and subtle to lend themselves to formulaic resolution. At the heart of my 
proposal, therefore, is the central question whether it is ever acceptable that lawyers might, 
can or should act in a professional capacity in such a way that would be contrary to their 
own moral values. My answer is that there ought to be a special and symbiotic relation 
between personal morality and professional expectations. However, in line with the 
overall contextualised recommendations of this pragmatic approach, the nature of this 
relation will be revisable and organic; it will develop and change as lawyers adapt 
themselves and their professional persona to contingent circumstances. Some of the more 
important recommendations for change and revision include: 
• There must be a shift of emphasis from professional regulation to personal 
responsibility. The ambition is not to promote a particular set of ethical outcomes or 
inculcate a specific mode of professional responsibility. It ought to be to challenge 
students and lawyers to develop a professional modus vivendi of their own that 
constructs as it constantly challenges and re-works an appropriate professional attitude 
and practice. 
• In the same way that there is no one or unchanging way to be a good person, there is 
no one or unchanging way to be a good lawyer. Each and every lawyer must be 
capable of developing a style and substance of lawyering that incorporates a continuing 
dialogue 
-with oneself, clients, other lawyers, other professionals, and the community at large 
about what counts as good lawyering. In many so-called hard cases, there is rarely an 
obvious or incontestable path to follow. 
• The professional Rules do not and cannot relieve lawyers of the continuing 
responsibility to exercise their own professional and moral judgement about the 
appropriate course to follow. Unthinking compliance with the specified Rules does 
not guarantee that lawyers will develop a sense of ethical judgment: professional 
morality is more than lawabiding conformity. The Rules are only a starting-point or 
resource in the broader debate about appropriate ethical behaviour: they act as the 
outside limits within which debate can and must occur. 
• Each individual lawyer and student must justify their sense of professional 
responsibility through their actions rather than justify their actions by reference to the 
ideals of professional responsibility. If the legal profession is to live up to its own 
cherished ideals and to reclaim its reputation as an honourable undertaking, it must 
challenge each of it present and future members to take this task seriously. 
• There is always the personal ethical challenge of determining whether, because the Rules 
allow certain conduct, the individual lawyer should reflect on and perhaps refuse to 
operate in certain ways. The fact that the Rules allow lawyers to ignore the interests 
of other parties entirely does not mean that it is a morally unimpeachable course to 
follow: 'can' does not necessarily imply 'must'. 
• Lawyers must be prepared to answer for the ethical choices which they make and the 
legal practice in which they engage. An explicit and enduring focus on the cultivation 
of a strong sense of professional purpose and judgment must be pursued and 
institutionalised. 
In conclusion, therefore, my primary recommendation has been to urge lawyers to 
take personal responsibility for what they say and do in their professional capacities. 
Although it seems a rather modest proposal, it has traditionally been treated as 
being of radical import and implication. 24 In a manner of speaking, what counts as the 
professional model is little more than the calcified values of one particular group of 
lawyers at one particular point in time; personal preference has been dignified with the 
institutional imprimatur of professional imperative. As with so much else in law, 
certain established groups have been able to pass off their ethical accents as the 
neutral voice of the legal profession. However, as the composition of the 
profession begins to change and diversify, it is important that there is a greater fit 
between the professional expectations of lawyers and their own personal consciences. 
Today's lawyers should have the same privileges as yesterday's lawyers -to practice 
law in such a way that their daily routines and decisions comport more closely to 
their own best sense of themselves as moral individuals. In this way, being an ethical 
lawyer can be less of a conforming chore and more of an aspiring responsibility. 
Moreover, so emboldened, individual lawyers might impact on the collective 
convictions of their colleagues and so enhance the overall reputation of the legal 
profession. 
In the same way that "good oratory is a good person speaking well,"25 so good 
lawyering is a good person acting well. As trivial and trite as this may seem, it is the 
best advice that can be given to the fledgling lawyer and the most compelling injunction 
to the jaded lawyer. It offers no magical guide as to what to do in any specific or 
conflicted situation because there is none to be given. It is for each person to arrive at an 
informed and conscientious decision in accordance with their own political and moral 
lights. The objective is not to chastise lawyers simply because they are corporate lawyers 
or represent rapists and bigots: it is to encourage each lawyer to take responsibility for 
the clients they take, the causes they fight for and the tactics they use. A sound account 
of legal ethics and professional responsibility must encourage lawyers to live up to their 
better ethical selves, not excuse them from that challenge. 
It is surely the case that, in answering Socrates's famous question about "how 
should one live?'', lawyers cannot respond by simply mumbling that it is acceptable to 
do whatever is not expressly prohibited by law or disallowed by the professional 
codes. This is not so much an ethical stance as an abnegation of one. As Hazard 
observes, "when all has been said, the fact will remain that a lawyer's ethical 
deliberations are a process of personal thought and action."26 In that process, students 
and lawyers must be prepared to answer for the ethical choices which they make and 
the legal practice in which they engage. Simply pointing to some rule is never enough 
on its own. Instead, there must be a greater acceptance of the fact that good 
professional judgement cannot be left to the untutored and catch-as-catch-can 
approach of the present legal community. An explicit and enduring focus on the 
cultivation of a strong sense of professional purpose and judgment must be pursued and 
institutionalised. 
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